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IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IS NO EXCUSE—
UNLESS YOU’RE A COP 
Hannah Dunn∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most are familiar with the Roman-originated maxim ignorantia 
juris non excusat—which, roughly translated, means “ignorance of 
the law is no excuse.”1 Courts generally follow this concept, codified 
in Section 2.02(9) of the Model Penal Code, which provides, 
“knowledge of the law defining the offense is not itself an element of 
the offense.”2 Yet a recent Supreme Court case decided that a police 
officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law is indeed an excuse 
sufficient to fulfill the reasonable suspicion needed to stop a vehicle 
under the Fourth Amendment.3 The Court has previously found that 
a “reasonable ‘ignorance of the law’ can be a defense to 
prosecution,”4 but the ruling is rarely applied.5 
In 2014, the Supreme Court once again deviated from ignorantia 
juris non excusat in Heien v. North Carolina6 by finding a police 
officer’s “reasonable” mistake of law adequate to satisfy the 
reasonable suspicion required for a traffic stop under the Fourth 
Amendment.7 
This Comment argues that because ignorance of the law is 
generally not an excuse for citizens, courts should hold police 
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 1. Ignorantia juris non excusat, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 2. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 note (AM. LAW INST. 2014) (Subsection (9)). 
 3. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 532 (2014). 
 4. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 225 (1957). 
 5. Rory Little, Opinion Analysis: Reasonable Mistakes of Law by Police Do Not Violate the 
Fourth Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 15, 2014, 7:17 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/ 
12/opinion-analysis-reasonable-mistakes-of-law-by-police-do-not-violate-the-fourth-amendment/. 
 6. 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014). 
 7. Id. at 532. 
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officers to the same standards—thus the Supreme Court should not 
have found the police officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law 
enough to support the reasonable suspicion needed to stop a vehicle 
under the Fourth Amendment. Part II of this Comment traces Heien’s 
journey to the Supreme Court, and Part III reviews the historical 
background of the Fourth Amendment and the reasonable suspicion 
standard. Part IV analyzes the Court’s conclusion, and Part V 
discusses why the Court should not have set such a loose standard. 
Lastly, Part VI addresses the potential ramifications of allowing 
police officers too much leeway regarding their knowledge of the 
law. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Facts 
On April 29, 2009, North Carolina police officer Sergeant Matt 
Darisse began following a Ford Escort after noting the driver looked 
“very stiff and nervous.”8 After noticing the Escort only had one 
functioning brake light, Sergeant Darisse pulled the vehicle over.9 
Two men were in the car: the driver—Maynor Javier Vasquez, and 
the owner of the vehicle—Nicholas Brady Heien.10 Sergeant Darisse 
explained that as “long as [Vasquez’s] license and registration 
checked out, he would receive only a warning ticket for the broken 
brake light.”11 Despite no problems with the record check, Sergeant 
Darisse became suspicious of Vasquez, who appeared nervous.12 
Vasquez agreed to answer Sergeant Darisse’s questions, and Heien 
gave consent for Sergeant Darisse to search the car.13 During the 
search, Sergeant Darisse and a fellow officer discovered a sandwich 
bag of cocaine in the vehicle.14 
B.  Procedural History 
North Carolina “charged Heien with attempted trafficking in 
cocaine.”15 Heien moved to suppress the cocaine seized from the 
 
 8. Id. at 534. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 535. 
2016] POLICE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW 553 
vehicle, arguing that the stop and subsequent search violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights.16 The State played a video recording of 
the stop, and both police officers testified at an evidentiary hearing, 
where the trial court denied the suppression motion and decided the 
search was valid.17 The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, 
noting the initial stop was not valid because “driving with only one 
working brake light was not actually a violation of North Carolina 
law,” therefore there was no justification for the stop.18 The State 
appealed, and the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed on the 
ground that Sergeant Darisse’s mistake of law was reasonable.19 The 
United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari.20 
III.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE REASONABLE  
SUSPICION STANDARD 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides, “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”21 As the decision in Heien notes, “a traffic stop for a 
suspected violation of law is a ‘seizure’ . . . and therefore must be 
conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.”22 In order to 
justify a traffic stop “seizure,” officers need “‘reasonable 
suspicion’—that is, ‘a particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting the particular person stopped’” has broken the law.23 
Even so, as the Court has long emphasized, and does so again in 
Heien, “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
‘reasonableness.’”24 Reasonable individuals make mistakes of law; 
thus, reasonable mistakes of law should not trigger Fourth 
Amendment violations.25 The Supreme Court has excused reasonable 
mistakes of fact to render warrantless searches compatible with the 
Fourth Amendment, and Heien argues that there is no reason the 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 536. 
 20. Id. 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 22. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536. 
 23. Id. (quoting Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687–88 (2014)). 
 24. Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014)). 
 25. Id. at 537. 
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outcome should differ when stemming from a reasonable mistake of 
law.26 
IV.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion for Heien, 
which affirmed the North Carolina Supreme Court’s judgment in an 
8-1 decision.27 Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsberg, filed a 
concurrence, and Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissent.28 Heien’s 
majority opinion focused on applying the same reasonableness 
standard used for mistake of fact to similarly situated “reasonable” 
mistakes of law.29 Both the majority and the dissent emphasized that 
the Court had not yet established a precedent for the “reasonable 
mistake of law question,” but dating back to 1809, the Supreme 
Court held “a reasonable mistake of law about probable cause 
permitted a customs seizure under a federal statute.”30 
Although customs cases are not “directly on point” for this 
particular constitutional question, Heien instead highlighted that no 
Court decision has “undermined that understanding that reasonable 
mistakes of law can excuse governmental action.”31 In more recent 
cases, such as Michigan v. DeFillippo,32 the Supreme Court found no 
Fourth Amendment violation even when the governmental search in 
question was based on a state statute later found unconstitutional.33 
The Court rejected the proposition to “limit the Court’s ruling 
solely [to] the exclusionary rule,” which likely was an attempt by 
Heien’s attorney to “preserve . . . relief for Heien on remand” as 
North Carolina does not read a good faith exception into the 
exclusionary rule.34 The Supreme Court found DeFillippo to be an 
explicit decision regarding the meaning of probable cause; therefore, 
 
 26. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–86 (1990) (holding that the 
warrantless search of a home remains lawful when undertaken with the consent of someone who 
reasonably appears to be, but is not, a resident); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802–05 (1971) 
(holding that a mistaken arrest of an individual matching a suspect’s description is lawful); 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (allowing government officials to make 
mistakes by giving them “fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection”). 
 27. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 532. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 532–33. 
 30. Little, supra note 5 (quoting another source). 
 31. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 32. 443 U.S. 31 (1979). 
 33. Id. at 40. 
 34. Little, supra note 5 (alteration in original) (quoting another source). 
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its holding about reasonable mistakes of law cannot be converted to 
apply as an exclusionary rule decision.35 
V.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Sergeant Darisse’s Mistake of Law Was Not Adequate 
to Satisfy Reasonable Suspicion 
As Justice Kagan’s concurrence points out, any reasonable 
mistake of law must involve a statute that poses “a ‘really difficult’ 
or ‘very hard question of statutory interpretation.’”36 The North 
Carolina statute in question provides, in its relevant part, that each 
car must be: 
[E]quipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle. The 
stop lamp shall display a red or amber light visible from a 
distance of not less than 100 feet to the rear in normal 
sunlight, and shall be actuated upon application of the 
service (foot) brake. The stop lamp may be incorporated 
into a unit with one or more rear lamps.37 
The majority opinion focuses on the language of the statute, 
concluding that because the “stop lamp” can be used with “one or 
more other rear lamps” and another subsection “of the same 
provision requires that vehicles ‘have all originally equipped rear 
lamps or the equivalent in good working order,’” all stop lamps on a 
vehicle must work.38 Because of this alleged ambiguity, the Supreme 
Court found the mistake of law to be reasonable.39 Justice Kagan 
came to the same conclusion, stating, “the Court’s analysis of 
Sergeant Darisse’s interpretation of the North Carolina law at issue 
here appropriately reflects these principles,” namely that the law 
poses a complex question of statutory interpretation.40 
The above analysis is not supported by the simplicity of the 
North Carolina statute. In order to comply, a vehicle must be 
equipped with “a stop lamp”—not stop lamps, but a singular, 
functional stop lamp.41 The language of the statute makes it 
explicitly clear—one stop lamp must be working. The Supreme 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 541 (2014) (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 37. Id. at 535 (majority opinion) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-129(g) (2007)). 
 38. Id. at 540. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 541 (Kagan J., concurring). 
 41. Id. at 532 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
556 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:551 
Court has faced exceedingly complex and challenging questions of 
statutory interpretation since its inception. The opinion admits 
outright that the “North Carolina statute at issue refers to ‘a stop 
lamp,’ suggesting the need for only a single working brake light.”42 
The interpretation that the statute also could mean all brake lights 
must work does not reconcile with the wording of “a” brake light. 
Even if the law were difficult to interpret, the burden lies on the 
government and law enforcement to interpret correctly—if not, no 
laws governing their actions would exist. 
B.  Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse 
Ignorantia juris non excusat is “commonly rendered” in English 
as “ignorance of the law is no excuse.”43 Glanville Williams asserts 
this maxim as “almost the only knowledge of law possessed by many 
people.”44 Heien recognizes this widely recognized maxim and gives 
some weight to the defense’s argument that it is “fundamentally 
unfair to let police officers get away with mistakes of law when the 
citizenry is accorded no such leeway.”45 The Court finds this maxim 
to be misunderstood: what it really means is that because an 
individual cannot get away with criminal activity based on lack of or 
misunderstanding of the law, the government “cannot impose 
criminal liability based on a mistaken understanding of the law.”46 
Aside from the thin nature of this line of reasoning, it is not 
applicable to the circumstances in Heien. The primary issue is not the 
government imposing criminal liability based on a mistaken 
understanding of the law, it is the acceptance of a police officer’s 
mistake of law to fulfill a standard necessary to take governmental 
action in the first place. 
C.  Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse, Sometimes 
While ignorance of the law is widely known to not be an excuse, 
the Supreme Court has previously allowed ignorance as an excuse.47 
Post-Heien, Twitter users were quick to post tweets “claiming that 
[Heien’s] ruling means the maxim applies to everyone except the 
 
 42. Id. at 540 (emphasis added). 
 43. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1. 
 44. Id. (quoting GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 405 (1978)). 
 45. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Little, supra note 5. 
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police.”48 Rory Little points out that this is inaccurate, and begs to 
put the “trending, but erroneous, sound bite to rest.”49 Little 
references Lambert v. California,50 in which the defendant was 
convicted under a Los Angeles city ordinance requiring all 
previously convicted felons to register if they remained in the city for 
more than five days.51 The Supreme Court found that because 
Lambert could not reasonably have known the law in question, her 
ignorance excused the violation.52 
The Lambert ruling bears no influence on Heien. Although in 
Lambert’s dissent Justice Frankfurter called the ruling “a derelict on 
the waters of the law,” the decision has never been read broadly and 
has rarely been applied.53 Furthermore, Lambert involves the 
Supreme Court’s misunderstanding of the law—not a private 
citizen’s, or a police officer’s.54 The reasonable mistake of law 
exception exists for situations such as Lambert—not for simple 
statutory interpretation as in Heien. 
D.  Giving Law Enforcement More Leeway: A Slippery Slope 
It may seem as if Sergeant Darisse’s mistake of law was 
reasonable and arguably even harmless. The facts of the case cannot 
be denied: Vasquez and Heien consented to Sergeant Darisse’s 
search of the vehicle, and Heien has no legal or constitutional right to 
possess a controlled substance such as cocaine. Thus, it could be 
easy to conclude that while the search may not have been obtained 
through constitutional means, no real privacy rights were invaded. 
But this is a dangerous argument that sets a precarious precedent. 
Law enforcement officials serve a vital role in protection and 
maintenance of the community. Nevertheless, limits on their power 
exist as safeguards of constitutional rights. Left unchecked, police 
officers have a tremendous amount of power and control at their 
fingertips. Recent events have only reinforced this point. 
In 2009, San Diego police officers pulled over David Leon Riley 
and, following policy, towed and impounded his vehicle due to 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
 51. Id. at 226–37. 
 52. Id. at 229. 
 53. Little, supra note 5. 
 54. Id. 
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Riley’s suspended license.55 The police officers performed an 
inventory search, which produced two handguns.56 After arresting 
Riley, the officer searched Riley’s cell phone without a warrant.57 
Riley challenged the search of his cell phone as a violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights.58 Modern cell phones are capable of 
holding an immense amount of information, much like a computer. 
Although the decision in Riley ruled that a warrantless search and 
seizure of the contents of a cell phone is unconstitutional,59 the police 
officers believed they had the authority to conduct the search in the 
first place. Giving law enforcement more wiggle room to perform 
warrantless searches and seizures will only lead to more 
constitutional violations, as seen in Riley. 
Police brutality also looms on the horizon as a rapidly growing 
problem. In 2014, police officer Darren Wilson fatally shot  
18-year-old unarmed Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri,60 
sparking community tension and leading to protests and civil 
unrest.61 About one month earlier, Eric Garner died in New York 
City after a police officer held Garner in a chokehold during an 
arrest.62 And on September 9th, 2015, retired professional tennis 
player James Blake was tackled and violently handcuffed by an 
undercover police officer that mistakenly believed Blake to be a 
suspect in a fraud investigation.63 All of the cases involved African 
American individuals and white police officers—race plays an 
enormous role in police brutality instances and is a subject far 
beyond the scope of this Comment. Yet giving the police more 
leeway and protection from constitutional violation accusations 
provides the power to continue violating constitutional freedoms. 
 
 55. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 2495. 
 59. Id. at 2485. 
 60. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
SHOOTING OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON 4 
(2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_ 
report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown_1.pdf. 
 61. Jack Healy, Ferguson, Still Tense, Grows Calmer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/us/michael-brown-darren-wilson-ferguson-protests.html. 
 62. Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man’s Death After Chokehold Raises Old Issue for 
the Police, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/nyregion/staten 
-island-man-dies-after-he-is-put-in-chokehold-during-arrest.html. 
 63. Liz Robbins & Al Baker, James Blake, Retired Tennis Pro, Says Police Pushed Him 
Down; Inquiry Is Opened, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/ 
nyregion/episode-involving-retired-tennis-pro-is-being-investigated-police-say.html. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should not have found Sergeant Darisse’s 
“reasonable” mistake of law sufficient to fulfill the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to justify the stop of Heien’s vehicle. The 
reasonable mistake of law exception exists to answer difficult and 
convoluted questions of statutory interpretation, not to ponder how 
many brake lights must work to comply with a statute that requires 
one working brake light. Additionally, ignorance of the law is not an 
excuse for citizenry, and therefore should not be an excuse for law 
enforcement. Giving this much leeway chips away at citizens’ faith 
in the law enforcement system, and leads to an imbalance in power 
between citizens and police officers. The exception was improperly 
applied, and the decision gives too much flexibility to police officers; 
such a precedent could prove fatal to the foundation of the 
constitutional rights awarded by the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
560 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:551 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
